Abstract-Key management plays fundamental role in research on security service in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). However, due to the resource constraints, establishing pairwise keys in WSNs is not a trivial tasks. Several exiting key management schemes have been proposed in literature to establish pairwise keys between sensor nodes, but they either can not offer strong resilience against node capture attacks or have overly large memory requirement to achieve high degree of connectivity. In this paper, we prose an efficient pairwise key management scheme. In the proposed scheme, the sensor nodes are given different security level and the compromised sensor nodes cannot disclose the key information in the sensor nodes which have higher security level The analysis indicates that compared with existing approaches, this proposed scheme offers a stronger resilience against node capture attack.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are composed of a large number of sensor nodes which are scattered in the target field to sensor environment data. Sensor nodes are significantly constrained in the amount of available resources, such as energy, storage, and computational capacity. WSNs have been considered in many applications [1, 2] , such as intruder detection, military tracking. When sensor networks operate in a hostile environment where they are exposed to many malicious attacks, security is critical issue in WSNs designing. The security goals for WSNs usually are confidentiality, authenticity, availability, and integrity [3, 4] . As the basic requirement for providing security functionality, key management plays a central role in the data encryption and authentication. The key management is WSNs is to generate and provide keys for secure communication. However, due to the extremely scarce resources available to each sensor node, recent research suggests that symmetric secret key predistribution is possible the only practical approach for establishing secure channels among sensor nodes.
Recently key predistribution schemes, which pre-load the key material in sensor nodes, have been proposed to tackle the key establishment problem in WSNs. In [5] Eschenauer and Gligor proposed the basic probabilistic key predistribution scheme, which refer as EG scheme in this paper. This scheme was based on random theory and probability theory. To guarantee an acceptable secure connectivity between sensor nodes in WSNs, the schemes require that the probability of each sensor nodes sharing at least one key with a neighbor sensor node be high. To realize these, the authors in this scheme advocate that a large pool of random keys will be generated at the server prior to the network deployment. And for every sensor node, a small fraction of keys, called key ring, is randomly selected from the key pool and is stored in its memory. Every two sensor nodes will have a certain probability to share at least one common key in their key ring. After deployment a secure link can be established between a pair of sensor nodes provided a key happen to be common to both these nodes. Chan et al. [6] extended the above scheme to enhance security and resilience of the networks. This scheme require that two sensor nodes are need have at least q (q>1) common keys in their key rings to establish a secure link. Thus, when q equals 1 this scheme is equivalent to the EG scheme.
De et al. [7] proposed a new key predistribution scheme combined the basic scheme in [5] with Blom's key pre-distribution mechanism [9] . In this scheme each node can pick rows from multiple secrete matrixes. Liu et al. [8] proposed a similar pairwise key scheme based on Blundo's polynomial-based key distribution scheme [10] . These two schemes exhibit a threshold: when the number of compromised nodes is smaller than security threshold, the probability of disclosed communication between noncompromised nodes is close to zero.
Camptepe and Yener [11] first applied combinatorial designs to key pre-distribution. They proposed two classed of combinatorial designs: symmetric-balanced incomplete block designs and generalized quadrangles. The points and blocks in the combinatorial designs are associated with the distinct key identifiers and nodes, respectively. Later, Sanchez and Balduls [12] made use of combinatorial design theory to the pre-distribution of multiple bivariate polynomial shares based on Blundo's [9] key pre-distribution. This scheme enable direct key establishment for a large number of nodes, independently of the physical connectivity properties of WSNs. Lee and Stinson [13, 14, 15] proposed a class of key predistribution schemes based on combinatorial designs. Their approaches improve the efficiency in direct-key and path-key establishments compared with the random key pre-distribution protocols.
The above schemes are all without pre-deployment kondlede. Du et al [16] developed a scheme using predeployment knowledge. In this scheme, they assume that the sensor nodes are deployed in groups of some sensor nodes over a rectangular area. In the key predistribution phase, the original key pool is divides into many smaller pools, each of which is associated to different group. These schemes can gain substantial improvement over exiting schemes that do not exploit deployment. This group-based deployment model is further deployed in [17, 18] . Another important works in the literature that aims increase the network resiliency without reducing secure connectivity was proposed in [19] [20] [21] [22] for multiphase sensor networks. In multiphase sensor networks, WSNs are set up to function for longer period of time as compared to the lifetime of sensor nodes. So, new nodes need to be deployed in some intervals to provide continuity of network in multi-phase sensor networks.
In these existing key pre-distribution schemes, as the number of number of compromised nodes increases, the fraction of affected pairwise keys increase quickly. As a result, a small number of compromised nodes may affect a large fraction of pairwise. In this paper, we propose a highly efficient key predistribution scheme, which combines the EG scheme and the hash function. The novelty of the scheme lies in that the sensor nodes will be given different security level. The preload keys in each sensor node are the security level times hash value of the keys directly selected from the key pool. With the oneway computation property of the hash function, no sensor nodes will disclose the key information in the higher security level sensor nodes. Compared with previous key pre-distribution schemes, our scheme can provide better resilience against sensor capture attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We give an overview of the EG scheme in Section Ⅱ. Then we describe the our new scheme in Section Ⅲ. Next we discuss the performance of the proposed scheme in Section Ⅳs. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section Ⅴ remarks.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE EG SCHEME
In this section, we briefly review the EG scheme which was proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [1] . The EG scheme is based on the probabilistic distribution of the key in which they guarantee that two neighboring nodes will have at least one common key in their key ring. Three phases are followed in this method: key predistribution phase, shared-key discovery phase, and path-key establishment phases.
The key predistribution phase is performed before sensor nodes are deployed. In this phase a large of pool of keys and their key identification are generated. Next, for each sensor node, t keys are randomly selected from the key pool P and stored into the node's memory. This set of t keys form the key ring of the sensor node, and are insert into its memory module. The number of keys in the key pool P, is chosen such that two random subsets of size t in S will share at least one key with some probability p.
After the sensor nodes have been deployed, the sharedkey discovery phase will be performed. In this phase the sensor nodes will find their neighbors who share at lease one common key in their key ring. For finding the common keys, the sensor nodes broadcast the identifiers of the keys within their communication range. If two neighboring sensor nodes find a common key identifier, then they can create a path between them using common keys. After the shared-key discovered phase is complete, a connected graph of secure links is formed. Sensor nodes can then set up path keys with their neighbors with which they do not share keys. If the graph is connected, a path can always be found from a source sensor to any of its neighbors. The source sensor can then generate a path key and send it securely via the path to the target sensor.
In the EG scheme, the size of the key pool P is critical to both the connectivity and resilience of the scheme. For a given t, the larger the size of the key pool P is, the lower local connectivity and the higher resilience are, and vice versa.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
The proposed scheme consists of three phases: initialization phase, share-key discover, and path-key establishment. Although the way to find shared key is different, the shared-key discover and path-key establishment path if more or less the same in the previous schemes. In our scheme, the most significant difference lies in the initialization phase. The details of the proposed schemes are described below. 
A. Initialization Phase
This phase is done offline by a Key Distributions Servers (KDS) before deploying the sensor nodes in a target field. It consists of the following steps:
Step 1: The KDS generates a very large pool of w keys and of their key identifiers. Here, we call these keys seed keys.
Step 2: For each sensor node, the KDS randomly generate a integer l as the security level of the sensor nodes, 1≤l≤L. Here, we call L the security level of the WSN.
Step 3: For a sensor node with a security level l, the KDS randomly chooses m seed keys from the key pool S , and then performs l times hash function operation on these m seed keys to generate m new keys which are called derivative keys in these paper and then stores these derivative keys to each sensor node. Here, we define that the derivative key has the same ID as its seed key. And if some derivative keys are generated with a seed key, we call these derivative keys are in the same family. For example, there is a sensor node u which has the security level l u , suppose the keys k i , 0<i≤m is directly picked from the key pool , then the preload keys k u,i in sensor node u are the keys ()
Hk. An example of key predistribution is illustrated in Fig.  1 .
B. Shared Key Discovery Phase
This phase takes place during wireless sensor networks initialization in the operation environment where every node discovery its neighbors in wireless communication range with which it can establish a key. To discovery whether two neighbor nodes can establish a common key, the source node disclose a list of ID of the keys and the security level of the sensor nodes.
Assuming that sensor u and sensor v are neighbors, and have received the list of key IDs and the security level of each other. Suppose the security level of the sensor node u is l u and that of the sensor node v is l v . If they determine the key k u is sensor node u and the key k v is sensor node v have a common key identifier, then they have keys which are in the same family. According the security level of sensor node u and sensor node v, the pairwise key between these sensor nodes can be computed as following method. There are three cases needed to be considered. 
C. Path Key Establishment Phase
The path key establishment phase is used to assign a path-key to selected pairs of sensor nodes that do not share a common key but are connected by two or more links created during the shared key discovery phase. Path keys need not be generated by sensor nodes. Basically, the source node broadcasts two lists of key IDs. One includes the key IDs at the source node, and the other includes the key IDs at the destination nodes. If one of the nodes that receive this request is able to establish direct keys with both the source and the destination nodes, it replies with a message that contains two encrypted copies of a randomly generated key. One encrypted the direct key with the source node, and the other encrypted by the direct key with the destination node. And both the source and the destination nodes can then get the new pairwise key from this message.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
In this section, we evaluate the proposed scheme. The evaluation metrics includes the network connectivity, the security, the storage overhead of every sensor node, the communication overhead, and the computation of every sensor node.
A. Connectivity Analysis
Probability of direct key establishment is an important metric to evaluate a key predistribution scheme. To achieve a desired global connectivity, the probability of direct key establishment must be higher than a certain threshold value. Now we calculate the probability of direct key establishment. Let P c denotes the probability that two neighboring sensor nodes say sensor node u and sensor node v, can establish communication pairwise keys directly. As described earlier, if the two sensor nodes contain the preload keys which are in the same family, the two sensor nodes can establish pair key directly. The keys in the family means the keys have the same ID. Then, we have: Figure 2 show the probability to establish direct key given different number of the keys preload in each sensor. In general, the larger m is, the higher the probability establishing a direct key between two physically neighboring nodes. The reason is that the more key in each sensor node, the higher the probability of two sensor nodes have the same key ID. But larger m is, the more memory is needed. 
B. Security Analysis
In this subsection, we study the resiliency of the proposed scheme against sensor capture through probability analysis. The resilience of the scheme is measured as the fractions of total network communication that are compromised when x sensor nodes are captured [2] . There are two node capture cases: and average node capture case and worst node capture case. 1) Average Case: Here we first consider the average case, in which the attacker can capture a set of sensor nodes randomly throughout the WSN. And from these capture sensor nodes, the attacker will get the generative keys in the no-compromised sensor nodes.
Because of the one-way computation property of the hash function, with the derivative k in a sensor with a security level l, nobody can get the derivative keys generated by the same seed key in a sensor node with higher level. Then in the proposed scheme if a node with a low security level has been compromised, the key information in the sensor nodes with the higher level will be disclosed which are in the family with the compromised key.
Suppose K be the communication key used by two non-compromised sensor nodes, and the higher security level of these two sensor nodes is a. Let A i represent the event that K is belong to the family F i . And B i represents the event there are c compromised sensor nodes that include the generation keys which are in the family F i . Suppose the lowest security lever of these c compromised sensor nodes is b, then when i nodes have been compromised, the probability of the communication key K will not been compromised is :
When x sensor nodes have been compromised, the probability the communication key K being compromised is
From paper [3] , we know that the probability of two sensor node have j common seed key is
Thus, the probability of a particular preload key being compromised can be estimated as
Since a compromised key will lead a link between noncompromised to be compromised, the fraction of the compromised links between non-compromised nodes can be estimated as P b . Fig. 3 shows the relationship between the fraction of compromised links for non-compromised nodes and the number of compromised nodes. We can see the higher the security level, the higher the fraction of compromised links for non-compromised. Now we compare our scheme with previous work. Here we mainly compared the security performance, which is the fraction of affected non-compromised. Here, we compare our scheme with EG scheme [1] , and qcomposite scheme (for q=2,3) [2] . We assume that each sensor node is capable of holding 200 cryptographic keys in its memory. The network connectivity probability P L is taken as P L =0.33 and P L =0.5 with suitable values of the parameters for the different schemes. Fig. 4 compares security performance of several key predistribution schemes. Given the same local connectivity P L , t and storage overhead. We clearly see that our scheme provides significantly much better security against sensor nodes capture than the EG scheme and the q-composite scheme. For example, given P c =0.34, where there has 400 sensor nodes compromised, there will be 55.2% of links compromised between noncompromised sensors in EG scheme, 78.6% in qcomposite (q=2), 94.0% in q-composite (q=3) while there will only be 37.9 % in our scheme.
2) Worst Case: Now we analyze the worst case. In this case, the generative keys in the captured sensor nodes will have the least common key ID. That is the generative keys in the captured sensor node are generated from the most seed keys.
Suppose the attack capture x sensor nodes and each sensor node has derivative m keys. When xm<w, the xm derivative keys in these x sensor nodes are generated from xm different seed keys key pool. When xm≥w, the xm derivative keys in these x sensor nodes are generated from w keys in the key pool. Suppose K be the communication key used by two non-compromised sensor nodes. From formula (1), we can get the probability the communication key K being compromised when x sensor nodes have been compromised. From the formula (3), we have the probability of a particular preload key being compromised can be estimated as
Fig . 5 gives the relationship between the fraction of compromised links for non-compromised nodes and the number of compromised nodes. Now we give a comparison between our scheme with EG scheme [1] , and q-composite scheme (for q=2,3) [2] . Fig. 6 denotes the fraction of links compromised between non-compromised sensor nodes vs. the number of capture sensor nodes. Given the same local connectivity P L , t and storage overhead. We clearly see that our scheme provides significantly much better security against sensor nodes capture than the EG scheme and the q-composite scheme. For example, given P c =0.34, where there has 200 sensor nodes compromised, here will only be 23.1 % in our scheme, 40.2% of links compromised between noncompromised sensors in EG scheme, and all sensor nodes will be completely compromised in q-composite (q=2) and q-composite (q=3). 
C. Overhead
Memory Overhead: According to our scheme, during the initialization phase each sensor node needs to store m keys over F q . In addition, each node needs to store the ID of the keys and the security level of the sensor nodes bit to identify the types of the keys. Assume the ID of sensor nodes are chosen from a finite field ' F q and the security of the sensor nodes are chosen from a finite field F [6] and q-composite scheme [7] , there are more '' log q bits storage needed. Communication Overhead: In the shared key discover phase each need to disclose of a list of m index of keys to its neighbor nodes. Like the memory overhead analyses, there are more than bits communication overhead needed compare with '' log q the EG scheme and q-composite scheme.
Computation Overhead: In terms of computation overhead. In the key predistribution phase there is no communication needed in all sensor nodes. During the shared key and path key discover phase, part of sensor nodes need to do hash computation. As in the qcomposite scheme, there is hash computation needed to compute the q common keys, so the computation overhead in our scheme is almost equal to that of in qcomposite scheme. In the EG scheme, there is no additional hash computation needed to compute the pairwise keys.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an efficient key management scheme for WSNs group-based key predistribution scheme that some compromised sensor nodes only affect part of uncompromised sensor nodes. In the scheme, each sensor node has a security level. And the compromised sensor nodes with a low level will not disclose the key information in the sensor nodes with a high level.
